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INDONESIA
ON NOVEMBER 6, 2003, the president of
Indonesia extended martial law for a second
six-month period in the province of Aceh to
“crush” the insurgent Free Aceh Movement
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM). The govern-
ment first imposed martial law in the north-
western province in May 2003 after the col-
lapse of a December 2002 peace deal with the
insurgents. Under the deal, the insurgents
agreed to deposit their guns into specially
designed gun banks in return for the govern-
ment’s withdrawal of its troops into defensive
positions. But neither side made any effort to
comply with the terms of the deal, and vio-
lence between the insurgents and government
forces intensified during the last weeks before
the deal’s breakdown. The government arrested
five GAM leaders who had recently been set
free, and it set a deadline of May 12 for the
rebels to disarm. The two sides attempted last
minute negotiations, but neither made any real
concessions and the talks quickly failed. Later
that month, the government deployed approx-
imately 30,000 troops against the estimated
5,000 GAM insurgents. The government
extended martial law because its forces were
unable to defeat the GAM within the martial
law’s original time period. 
The conflict over Aceh has resulted in 26
years of civil war and an estimated 10,000
deaths. Led by Hasan di Tiro, a descendant of
the last sultan of Aceh, the GAM was founded
in 1976 by Aceh residents to protest the
region’s forced incorporation into Indonesia by
Dutch colonizers in the 1950s. Over years of
government intransigence and exploitation of
Aceh’s natural resources, particularly its vast
reserves of crude oil, the GAM evolved into an
insurgency fighting for complete independ-
ence. Although the Indonesian government is
prepared to offer autonomy to the province, it
will not accept complete independence.
Since imposing martial law in Aceh, the
government has restricted access to the region
by journalists, local and international human
rights observers, and humanitarian organiza-
tions. The government claims that the restric-
tions were imposed solely out of concern for
the safety of these individuals and groups.
Indeed, past events such as the reported abduc-
tion of two journalists by GAM forces and the
reported beating of an Indonesian radio jour-
nalist by government elite forces highlight the
perilous nature of the conflict in Aceh for non-
combatants, even those clearly marked as non-
partisan observers. Opponents of the travel
ban nevertheless argue that international
observers are necessary to ensure that both
sides to the conflict respect applicable human
rights and humanitarian law provisions, and to
pressure the Indonesian government to apply
these provisions in its anti-terrorism campaign
launched in the wake of the October 2002 Bali
bombings.
The province has lately seen a steep
increase in violence, in the displacement of
civilians, and in shortages of basic necessities.
Based on the information that can be gathered
from inside Aceh, witnesses charge the govern-
ment with a long list of human rights and
humanitarian law abuses such as the indiscrim-
inate, extra-judicial killing of civilians, young
men in particular, regardless of whether they
are wearing a GAM uniform or carrying a gun.
Speaking on this topic, Juwono Sudarsono, the
Indonesian Ambassador to the United
Kingdom, acknowledged that the military did
not have complete control of all its troops in
the province but explained, “you cannot expect
legal accountability in a war situation,” stating
that “the precise rules of humanitarian law just
go out the window once the shooting starts.”
The GAM has also been accused of com-
mitting their own atrocities, but reports have
not been confirmed because independent
observers lack access to the region. Additional
unconfirmed reports claim that some or all of
these acts have been committed by military
personnel disguised as GAM members. 
As of late November 2003, the government
claimed to have killed more that 1,100 GAM
soldiers and to have an additional 2,000 in cus-
tody through arrests or surrenders. Both sides
also acknowledged the deaths of more than
300 civilians, although neither will take
responsibility for those deaths. Although GAM
seems to enjoy popular support, civilians have
borne the brunt of the conflict through food
shortages, forced movement into camps, and
the assassination of young men accused of
being GAM members.
Last June, the government charged and
tried a number of soldiers for abusing civilians
in Aceh. The soldiers, however, were given only
light sentences, making it unlikely that the tri-
als will be a deterrent to future soldier abuse of
local civilians.
Of additional concern is the charge that the
Indonesian military is training militia groups
to fight GAM forces, similar to those used dur-
ing the conflict in East Timor. Numerous mil-
itary officers were charged with war-time abus-
es in that campaign for not controlling the
behavior of such groups. 
The conflict in Aceh is the Indonesian gov-
ernment’s largest military campaign since its
invasion of East Timor in 1975. Some claim
that as many as 120,000 people died during
that conflict, as much from the violence as
from the resulting starvation and disease. 
IRAQ
ON JANUARY 9, 2004, the U.S. Department
of Defense designated former Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein as a “prisoner of war.” U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that
Saddam Hussein’s status as a prisoner of war
“can be reviewed at any time, more than once.”
As a prisoner of war, the former Iraqi president
is accorded the protections of the Geneva
Conventions. Pursuant to the Third Geneva
Convention to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War (Third Convention), the U.S. must pro-
vide prisoners of war humane treatment, ade-
quate housing, sufficient food, clothing, and
medical care. Article 126 of the Third Geneva
Convention permits the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit
prisoners of war to ensure Convention stan-
dards are met. ICRC spokespeople said in
January 2004 that the organization submitted
a request to visit Saddam Hussein, which has
recently been granted. 
According to the Associated Press, the U.S.
is holding the former Iraqi leader at an undis-
closed location, and the U.S. Central Intelli-
gence Agency will conduct his interrogation.
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Under article 17 of the Third Convention, a
prisoner of war is only required to give “his
surname, first name and rank, date of birth,
and army, regimental, personal or serial num-
ber.” Additionally, the Third Convention pro-
hibits the U.S. from using any form of “physi-
cal or mental torture, [or] any other form of
coercion” in order to “secure from them infor-
mation of any kind whatever.” Article 17 also
states that, “prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or
exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.” The articles protect
Saddam Hussein during pre-trial interrogation
by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell said in January,
“I can't say [Saddam Hussein is] being co-
operative. He realizes that he will be facing
trial. He realizes the difficulties that he is in
and what is facing him. So he's trying to pro-
tect himself.” 
Secretary of State Powell also said that the
best option would be to try Hussein after the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the
U.S.-led temporary governing authority in
Iraq, hands power to the Iraqis in July. Article
84 of the Third Convention provides that, “a
prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military
court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining
Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a
member of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power in respect to the particular offense
alleged to have been committed by the prison-
er of war.” The court must offer “the essential
guarantees of independence and impartiality”
under article 84. 
According to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld,
the possibility of Saddam Hussein’s prosecution
in a U.S. military tribunal is “low.” Rumsfeld
stated that Saddam Hussein has the potential to
be prosecuted for crimes against the Iraqi,
Kuwaiti and Iranian people, as well as for “activ-
ities after May 1 involving the insurgency and
the killing of coalition troops.” Rumsfeld did
not elaborate on the type of court or location
where the trial will be held. Secretary of State
Powell said in January that Hussein would be
“put on trial with international observers partic-
ipating,” but failed to provide further details. A
new statute adopted by the Iraqi Governing
Council provides a proposed model for a tribu-
nal that would prosecute Saddam Hussein and
would include a provision for the appointment
of international observers. 
On December 10, 2003, the Iraqi
Governing Council adopted a statute provid-
ing for the “Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes
Against Humanity.” Pursuant to article 1 of
the statute, the tribunal will consist of five
judges appointed by the Iraqi Governing
Council and will try all cases involving geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
certain crimes against Iraqi law committed
during the period between July 17, 1968 and
May 1, 2003. The tribunal may try cases
involving crimes committed in Iraq or else-
where, including the Iran-Iraq War and the
1991 Gulf War. Additionally, under article 1 of
the statute, the tribunal will have jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed against the people of Iraq, whether
or not committed during armed conflict. The
statute stipulates that the Iraqi Governing
Council will nominate and appoint the presi-
dent of the tribunal. 
Following the adoption of the statute by
the Iraqi Governing Council, the CPA con-
ducted a training session for 100 Iraqi
lawyers and judges on war crimes and inter-
national law. Article 6 of the statute requires
the president of the tribunal “to appoint
non-Iraqi nationals to act in advisory capac-
ities or as observers to the Trial Chambers
and to the Appeals Chamber.” Under the
statute, “the role of the non-Iraqi nationals
shall be to provide assistance to the judges
with respect to international law and the
experience of similar tribunals (whether
international or otherwise), and to monitor
the Tribunal’s protection of general due
process of law standards.”
On January 10, 2004, the CPA authorized
the Iraqi Governing Council to establish the
Iraqi Special Tribunal under Order No. 48,
entitled the “Delegation of Authority
Regarding Establishment of an Iraqi Special
Tribunal.” Under the CPA Order No. 48,
however, CPA Administrator, Paul Bremmer,
reserved the right to alter the statute and
ordered that non-Iraqi nationals may be
appointed as judges to the Special Tribunal.
KAZAKHSTAN
ON JANUARY 10, KAZAKHSTAN’S parlia-
ment passed a new law, effective immediately,
ending the death penalty and replacing the
maximum sentence with life in prison. This
law follows President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s
moratorium on the death penalty that he had
imposed on December 19, 2003, pending the
new legislation. To justify his decision, the
president referred to article 15 of the
Constitution, which provides in part that
“[e]veryone shall have the right to life.”
Kazakhstan has steadily modernized its
penal system since gaining independence in
1991. It had already abolished the death penal-
ty for crimes such as theft, robbery, and rape as
remnants from the period of Soviet rule. This
new law, effectively ending capital punishment
in the country, culminates the reform process
by abolishing the death penalty for murder
convictions. The decree also directs the prose-
cutor general to evaluate the legality of the sen-
tences of the six people presently sitting on
death row.
Although Kazakhstan has earned praise for
its work on human rights, observers and
activists indicate that the country’s criminal




The Kenyan Constitution, originally creat-
ed after independence in 1963, has undergone
frequent revisions. The Constitution of Kenya
Review Commission notes that the history of
the Constitution chronicles the political strug-
gles and shifts in government since Kenyan
independence. The latest of the constitutional
revisions began shortly after President Mwai
Kibaki was elected and were to be completed
by June 2003, in order to allow the Kenyan
people the opportunity to take part in the con-
struction of a more democratic Constitution.
After an impasse of several months, dele-
gates of the National Constitutional Confer-
ence (Conference) resolved in January 2003
that the cabinet should have between 15 to 20
members and a similar number of deputy min-
isters. The number of members of the cabinet
and other similar matters prevented the com-
pletion of the constitutional revision process. 
The Conference also recommended that
the president should no longer have power to
dissolve Parliament. During his election cam-
paign, President Kibaki promised that Raila
Odinga, one of his key allies, would become
the prime minister, but in the midst of the
constitutional revision process, many of the
delegates to the Conference disagreed on the
formation of the Office of Prime Minister.
The Conference has agreed that the office
should be created. Additionally, the Confer-
ence suggested that the Cabinet will be rec-
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ommended by the prime minister and
appointed by the president. Further, the Par-
liament should be governed by standard rules
deciding such issues as when and how Parlia-
ment may be convened. The Kenya Times
noted that this was done to gain the institu-
tion respect and free it from undue external
interference.
The delegates drafting the chapter on the
judiciary laid out guidelines for the vetting
and appointment of the chief justice and the
judges of the Supreme Court, the courts of
appeal, and high courts. Under the new
scheme, the judges will be recommended by
the Judicial Service Commission, approved
by the relevant standing committee of
Parliament and then appointed by the presi-
dent. The guidelines also established stan-
dards such as moral conduct and years of
experience that should be taken into account
in the appointment process. 
HIV/AIDS INFECTED CHILDREN
DENIED ACCESS TO EDUCATION
Seventy-two children filed a lawsuit on
January 7, 2004, against the Kenyan govern-
ment for denying them access to public
schools because of their HIV/AIDS status.
President Kibaki campaigned in 2002 on a
platform of free and universal primary educa-
tion for all Kenyan children. In light of this
promise, lawyer Ababu Namwamba, counsel
for the children, alleged that the Nairobi
City Council, the City Council Education
Department, school principals, and the Min-
istry of Education denied abandoned and
orphaned HIV-positive children access to
education and discriminated against them.
The children sought to have the court declare
that any school official who denied them
admission breached their constitutional right
to education, the Kenyan Children’s Act, and
offended international agreements on the
rights of the child. State lawyers John
Gacivih and Rosemary Owino denied the
claims of discrimination.
On January 10, 2004, the government
acceded to the children’s demands.
Namwamba told reporters that “we have
reached consent with the government that the
children be taken into class immediately.” He
later added, “Our judiciary has demonstrated
its readiness to uphold and assert human enti-
tlements of all shades, including those within
the socio-economic realm, as being due to all
classes of the citizenry, no less the vulnerable,
the weak and the voiceless.”
MOROCCO
IN JANUARY 2004, MOROCCAN KING
Mohammed VI pardoned thirty-three prison-
ers, including several Moroccan journalists
such as Ali L’mrabit. L’mrabit was serving a
three-year sentence for charges of undermining
sacred institutions through the press. L’mrabit
worked as editor-in-chief of the French-lan-
guage Demain and Arabic-language Doumane
weekly satirical magazines. In June 2003, a
Moroccan court sentenced him for publishing
in Demain satirical cartoons and articles about
the royal family, which questioned the alloca-
tion of the royal household budget and
opposed Morocco's policy regarding the
Western Sahara. In 2002, a Moroccan court
sentenced L’mrabit to four months in prison
for disseminating false reports by publishing an
article stating that the royal palace was for sale.
L’mrabit serves as the Moroccan representa-
tive of Reporters Without Borders (RSF),
which condemned the charges against him
upon his sentencing. RSF Secretary-General
Robert Menard said that the RSF “thanks King
Mohammed VI for the release of Ali L’mrabit
and [journalist] Mohammed El-Hourd.”
Menard stated, however, that “we regret never-
theless that these two men were in prison for so
long and hope that no journalists will be jailed
again in Morocco.” Hassan Aourid, the palace
spokesperson, said that the king pardoned the
thirty-three prisoners for “humanitarian rea-
sons” and that the pardons reflected “the
King's firm desire to consolidate the rule of the
law and promote human rights.”
Coincidentally, the king also established
the Justice and Reconciliation Commission
(Commission) to address six thousand past
cases of alleged disappearances and torture.
According to the Moroccan Minister of Jus-
tice Muhamad Bu Zabaa, the king’s pardon of
the thirty-three prisoners showed King
Mohammed VI’s support of the Commission. 
The Commission is chaired by Driss
Benzekri, Secretary General of the palace-
appointed Human Rights Advisory Council
(CCDH). The CCDH serves as an advisory
body on human rights issues. The Commission
was recommended by the CCDH and
approved by King Mohammed VI in
November 2003.
Half of the Commission’s membership
comes from the CCDH, including Ahmed
Chaouki Benyoub, Vice-President of the
Moroccan Human Rights Organization
(OMDH), Latifa Jbabdi, Chairwoman of the
Union of Women's Action, and Mustapha
Iznasni, founding member of the Moroccan
Human Rights Organization (OMDH).
OMDH former president Abdelaziz Bennani
also serves on the Commission.
The Commission will pursue out-of-court
settlements for compensation to victims and
their families in cases related to forced disap-
pearances and arbitrary detention occurring
during the reign of the late King Hassan II,
which lasted from 1968 until 1991. According
to Chairman Benzekri, the purpose of the
Commission is to “establish the truth and
obtain financial compensation for victims and
their families.” 
The Commission, however, will not
address current allegations of human rights
abuses. In October 2003, the United Nations
Committee Against Torture expressed con-
cern that the Commission has not attended to
reports of torture. Regarding past allegations,
however, the king stated that the Commission
will “reconcile Moroccans with their history.”
The king set a deadline of February 13, 2004,
for the Commission to receive compensation
requests for material and moral damages.
TURKMENISTAN
TURKMENISTAN PASSED NEW LEGISLATION
last November requiring all NGOs in the
country to register with the Ministry of
Justice. The Law on Public Associations
(LPA), which applies to both domestic organ-
izations and international organizations with
branches operating in the country, requires
NGOs to follow lengthy and confusing regis-
tration procedures for obtaining government
approval. The LPA, which consists of seven
chapters and thirty-three articles, is unclear
about what the NGOs are specifically required
to register. Article 16 of the LPA requires all
NGOs to have a public association charter
and lists eleven provisions that the charter
must contain. Many of these provisions are
difficult to assess and involve complex infor-
mation that many small organizations general-
ly do not have. One such provision, for exam-
ple, requires NGOs to outline the “procedure
for its reorganization, liquidation, and dispos-
al of property/assets after liquidation.”
continued on page 45 
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The obscurity of the LPA’s provisions has
left a number of active organizations unregis-
tered and confused about what steps to take.
If apprehended, these NGOs face penalties
such as fines, sentences of up to one year of
“corrective labor,” up to six months in jail,
and confiscation of the organization’s equip-
ment and property. 
Supposedly in response to a failed attempt
on his life more than a year ago when his
motorcade came under machine-gun fire, and
despite protests by human rights organizations
and foreign governments, President
Saparmurat Niyazov has imposed ever-increas-
ing government control over civil society
through the enforcement of such laws as the
LPA. Thus far, forty-six people have been con-
victed for their alleged involvement in the
assassination attempt. 
ZAMBIA
PRESIDENT LEVY MWANAWASA DISMISSED
Mukelabai Mukelabai, the director of public
prosecutions (DPP), on January 9, 2004,
because of allegations that he mishandled cases
implicating former President Frederick Chiluba
in corruption. President Mwanawasa cited
anonymous letters which alleged that
Mukelabai had met with the former Director
General of the Zambian Security and
Intelligence Service, Xavier Chungu, who is
also charged with stealing from the govern-
ment. President Mwanawasa told reporters that
the allegations against Mukelabai were so seri-
ous that the DPP had to be forced from his
position, although no formal charges of being
involved in the corruption scandal have been
brought against Mukelabai. Mr. Mukelabai was
ordered to hand over all his cases. At the same
time, conflicting reports of Mr. Mukelabai
sending President Mwanawasa a resignation
letter have been reported by the Zambian Post.
Initially, news of the forced resignation of
Mukelabai was welcomed by many within the
political and legal communities. However, the
Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) has since
stated that the president has violated article 58
of the Constitution which states that the DPP
can only be removed if he is found “incompe-
tent or unable to perform the functions of his
office, by reason of infirmity of body or mind
or for misbehavior, by an independent tribunal
appointed to investigate any claims of incom-
petence.” Michael Musonda, president of the
LAZ said that “whatever the reasons for want-
ing Mr. Mukelabai out, the President has to
adhere to the Constitution.” Mukelabai says he
is confident that if such a tribunal were
enforced, he would be found innocent of the
charges.  HRB
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